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Abstract 
 
This article examines the impact of new political communication strategies upon state 
policy towards Palestinian Arab media in Israel. While the majority of studies on 
Palestinian Arab media in Israel have tended to focus upon patterns of media 
production or consumption by the minority, little attention has been given to the 
relationship between the structural dimensions of power and inequality in society and 
the development of Palestinian counter-hegemony in Israel. This article examines the 
location of Palestinian Arab media within the broader system of Jewish ethnocratic 
control in Israel and argues that despite the diverse range of modern media at its 
disposal, the Palestinian Arab minority – together with its media – remains 
marginalized and limited in its ability to affect political change within Israeli society.  
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A national minority in a Jewish ethnocratic state 
Following the armistice agreements of 1949, approximately 150,000 Palestinians 
became citizens of the State of Israel (Peleg 2004: 416–17). Today, this number has 
grown to over 1.5 million, representing 20 per cent of the total population (CBS 
2010). While historically and culturally part of the wider Palestinian people, 
Palestinian Arabs in Israel have, since 1948, followed a unique political and historical 
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trajectory as Israeli citizens. Variously referred to as ‘Arab Israelis’, ‘Palestinian 
Arabs in Israel’, ‘48 Arabs’ or ‘Insider Arabs’ (Arab fi Dakhil), they enjoy many of 
the same benefits and rights as Israeli Jews.  
 
Despite these benefits, Palestinian Arabs in Israel have faced significant problems as a 
direct result of their national identity and the particular nature of the state. 
Marginalized as a non-Jewish minority and suspected as a potential fifth column, the 
presence of a sizable, indigenous Palestinian Arab national minority has posed an 
implicit, and sometimes also an explicit, counter-hegemonic challenge not only to the 
ideological concept of a Jewish state but to the future maintenance of a Jewish 
demographic majority within it.  
 
It was within this atmosphere of fear and suspicion that the Palestinian Arab minority 
in Israel was subjected to eighteen years of harsh military rule (1948–66) (Peleg 2004: 
417). Already weakened by a war which saw them significantly reduced in number 
and disconnected from each other in three main Arab enclaves in Israel (the Galilee, 
the Triangle and the Negev) – and without any form of political, intellectual, 
economic or cultural leadership to guide or represent their interests – military rule 
imposed tight controls which further restricted their ability to move, work, organize 
and speak freely. In addition to physical containment, political surveillance and 
censorship, military rule allowed the wide-scale expropriation of Arab lands by the 
state and its agencies, thereby facilitating Jewish settlement and undermining what 
were perceived to be residual Arab strongholds in the country (Jiryis 1968; Jamal 
2009b: 29–32).  
 
One of the first to focus on the discriminatory and instrumental nature of Israeli state 
policy towards the Palestinian Arab minority, and its broader impact upon state–
minority relations in Israel, was Sammy Smooha. In his 1978 study, Israel: Pluralism 
and Conflict, Smooha argued that the Israeli authorities were interested in engineering 
the ‘pacification’ of the minority through a combination of carrot-and-stick initiatives, 
whereby the ‘carrot’ of voluntary ‘compliance’ was understood to be based on 
recognition of the obvious benefits, incentives and rewards available to them as 
citizens of the state, and the ‘stick’ was based on their forced ‘economic dependence’ 
on, and ‘political subordination’ to, the Jewish majority (Smooha 1978: 45–46). 
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Critically, Smooha made a radical departure from earlier and more traditional 
analyses of Israel as a liberal democracy by suggesting that Israel’s policy towards its 
Palestinian Arab minority could, cumulatively speaking, be understood as ‘an 
effective machinoy of control-exclusion, dependence and subordination’ (Smooha 
1978: 45). This he developed through his understanding of Israel as an ‘ethnic 
democracy’ (Smooha 1997: 199–200). 
 
While Smooha led the way in challenging the hegemonic, or pro-establishment, 
Israeli academic view of the state as a ‘normal’ democracy, he nonetheless maintained 
that Israel is basically more democratic than ethnic in nature. This conclusion was, 
however, rigorously challenged by other Israeli academics, such as Oren Yiftachel, 
As’ad Ghanem and Nadim Rouhana, who argued that the presence of democratic 
features alone represents an insufficient criterion for defining Israel as a democratic 
state (Ghanem et al. 1998: 254). Having identified a basic dissonance between the 
concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘ethnicity’, they argued that given the contradiction 
between democratic and ethnic principles and interests, an asymmetrical relationship, 
or hierarchy, exists between them, with the ethnic nature of the state dominating, or 
subordinating, the democratic strand when the two collide.  
 
Of the features that characterize ethnocratic regimes and that distinguish them from 
other forms of governance, Yiftachel stressed that not only is ethnicity the overriding 
determinant of rights and privileges in an ethnocratic state, but that the ‘charter’ 
group, which Smooha refers to as the ‘core ethnic nation’, ‘appropriates the state 
apparatus, determines most public policies, and segregates itself from other groups’ 
(Yiftachel 1999b: 367–68). In addition to the institutional segregation and 
stratification of ethnic groups in society, ethnocratic regimes legitimize themselves 
not only through a supportive ‘cultural and ideological apparatus’ but also through the 
maintenance of ‘selective openness’, which, in turn, facilitates the operation of a 
complex and extensive system of control (Yiftachel 1999b: 367–68). 
 
Yiftachel has primarily tested his understanding of Israel as an ethnocratic regime 
through several studies examining the discriminatory nature of the state’s land 
policies, particularly with regard to urban planning, settlement and zoning strategies 
(Yiftachel 1995, 1999a and 1999b). His analyses, while focusing on recent policies, 
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rely heavily on earlier contributions made by Ian Lustick in his groundbreaking work, 
Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority. Writing in 1980, 
Lustick was interested in exploring the ‘seeming docility’ of the Palestinian Arab 
minority and why ‘Arab discontent’ with discriminatory policies had not led to either 
an outbreak of ethnic conflict in society or to their political mobilization (Lustick 
1980: 8, 15, 24). Lustick concluded that the reasons lay in ‘the presence of a highly 
effective system of control which, since 1948, has operated over Israeli Arabs’ 
(Lustick 1980: 25). Observing a highly sophisticated and predominantly extralegal 
system of control which operated alongside, but not subordinate to, official 
proclamations, declarations, laws and policies of the state, Lustick identified three 
main components or ‘functional requisites’ which define the Israeli control system: 
segmentation, dependence and co-optation which were reinforced and operationalized 
through structural, institutional and programmatic dimensions of power (Lustick: 
1980: 77). 
 
Seen cumulatively, Israel’s system of control is understood to be based on the 
‘network of mutually reinforcing relations which has emerged from these structural, 
institutional and programmatic patterns’ and the ‘reciprocal interdependencies’ which 
have been forged between them based upon each separate level of analysis (Lustick 
1980: 77–78). While Lustick’s systemic approach highlighted the complex, dialectical 
and evolving nature of control, as well as the capacity of the overall system of control 
to change and adapt itself over time in line with new circumstances and realities, the 
relevance of his approach to current understandings of state policy towards the 
Palestinian Arab minority in Israel has been weakened by two main factors.  
 
The first factor concerns the temporal limits of his research and how he anticipated 
various ‘challenges to the system’ would ultimately become reconciled within it. 
Lustick’s analysis focused primarily on the period of military rule. With the end of 
military rule in 1966, and the relaxation of the bulk of emergency regulations which 
had hitherto contained and repressed the Palestinian Arab minority, a new period of 
self-confidence and awareness emerged within the minority. Following renewed 
contact with Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) from 1967, 
the Palestinian Arab minority underwent a national revival, which was, in turn, 
reflected in the nature of their political engagement. The ‘Palestinization’ (Rekhess 
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2007: 7) of minority politics in Israel brought to a definitive end the notion of a 
‘quiescent’ and ‘docile’ minority (Lustick 1980: 232–50). Faced with growing 
challenges to its control system, Lustick forecast three different possible regime 
responses: ‘system adaptation, breakdown or transformation’. Given the concomitant 
strengthening of democratic forces within society, and the emergence of important 
Israeli Jewish circles which were critical of the state and its policy towards the 
minority, Lustick and others forecast that the Israeli system of control was coming to 
an end (Lustick 1980: 252–65). This optimistic assumption undermined his previous 
understanding of the dialectical and dynamic nature of control in maintaining stability 
in deeply divided societies. It also overlooked the structural potential for a 
sophistication of control in line with changing circumstances and realities over time. 
Despite this, Lustick’s contributions to systemic control theory continue to influence 
critical scholarship on the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel (see, for example, Falah 
1991, al-Haj 1995 or Ghanem 1998).  
 
The second major weakness of Lustick’s analytical framework concerns the dated 
nature of the policy areas that he examined and the rigid nature of his analytical 
framework. While land policies, electoral politics and the politics of identity (and 
recognition) continue to play major parts of the state’s control strategies today, little 
conceptual space has been provided in Lustick’s analytical framework to 
accommodate changes over time, particularly with regard to the impact of new 
cultural and political developments and processes upon the nature and format of 
control. This is strikingly evident with respect to the role of the media.  
 
The development of new political communication and media strategies, and its impact 
upon state policies towards the Palestinian Arab minority, has not been adequately 
dealt with either within the existing literature on the Palestinian Arab minority in 
Israel or within the broader literature on Israeli media. Traditionally subsumed within 
broader political studies of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel, the growing 
importance of new political communication and media strategies has, until recently, 
received very little in the way of focused or critical attention.  
 
Haim Koren, for example, has analysed the development and consumption of media 
by the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel according to four different categories: 
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domestic (Israeli) media (including Arabic media in Israel), Palestinian media (in 
Israel and the OPTs), regional (Arabic) media and international (Arabic) media. This 
study, which frames its analysis within the pro-establishment discourse of the 
‘identity problem’ of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel as ‘a minority (Arab 
citizens of Israel) inside a minority (Jews of Israel inside the Arab Middle East) inside 
a majority (Arabs in the entire Middle East)’, ignores the ethnocratic nature of the 
state entirely and analyses the development both of Palestinian Arab media as a 
largely independent and free-floating institution (Koren 2003: 213). 
  
By contrast, Michael Dahan’s short study examining the impact of new information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) upon Palestinian media in Israel focuses on 
the relationship between new technologies and media production. Identifying new 
‘possibilities for empowerment’ that these new ICTs have created for the minority, he 
acknowledges that ‘the political and cultural hegemony of the Jewish majority in 
Israel is maintained in spite of the democratic potential of CMC [computer-mediated 
communication] and ICTs’. Whilst recognizing that the ‘democratic potential’ of 
ICTs is stuck between the ‘rock’ of ‘discrimination within Israeli society’ and the 
‘hard place’ of ‘lack of infrastructure, training and investment in IT in the Arab sector 
in Israel’, his analysis falls short of accounting for the systemic role of state controls 
in limiting the capacity of ICTs for the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel (Dahan 
2003).  
 
The go-to scholar on Palestinian Arab media in Israel, Amal Jamal, has also thrown 
important light on the ‘structural opportunities’ provided by the globalization of mass 
media to minorities ‘to overcome state control and surveillance policies and develop 
counter-hegemonic public spheres that meet the needs, interests and aspirations of the 
minority’ (Jamal 2009b: 1–2). Jamal’s work is, however, primarily concerned with the 
consumption of Palestinian Arab media by the minority itself. While identifying Israel 
to be a ‘nationalizing state’ that is based on a hegemonic ‘core nation’ (Jamal 2009b: 
23–24), Jamal fails to address either the impact of the minority’s counter-hegemonic 
discourse upon state hegemony or the response of a ‘nationalizing state’ such as Israel 
to the minority’s counter-hegemonic discourse. By choosing to focus on Palestinian 
Arab media in isolation from its wider structural context, the dialectical nature of the 
relationship between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces in Israel is minimized, 
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as is the capacity for understanding changes to the systemic nature of state control 
over time. 
 
This article will contribute to the existing literature by charting state responses to the 
development of counter-hegemonic Palestinian media over time and analysing the 
impact that these responses have had on the systemic nature of ethnocratic control in 
Israel today.  
 
The evolution of Palestinian Arab media in Israel 
The most widely distributed newspapers at the turn of the twentieth century were 
Filisteen, al-Karmel, al-Difa’a and al-Mufid (Jamal 2009a: 562; Jamal 2009b: 40). 
While readership of these newspapers remained restricted to the Palestinian elites – a 
trend caused by large gaps in education, literacy and general socio-economic 
standards between different segments of the population – their existence played an 
important part in a broader process of political development that saw the emergence 
of modern Palestinian national consciousness as a distinct communal and political 
identity in the region (Khalidi 1997: 42). 
 
The development of distinct Palestinian media was interrupted with the establishment 
of the State of Israel in 1948. Following the first Arab–Israeli war, only one Arabic 
newspaper, al-Ittihad/Unity, was to survive in Israel (Jamal 2009: 41). Founded in 
1944 as the Arabic organ of the Communist Party, the survival of this newspaper was 
in significant part due to its former marginal role within the Palestinian political elite 
and the mixed Jewish–Arab ranks of the Communist Party (Kaufman 1997: 26–28). 
Until the early 1980s, al-Ittihad dominated the Arabic print press scene in Israel and 
became not only the principal ‘Arab national newspaper for Insider Arabs’ but was 
also considered to be the ‘authentic representative’ of Arab national views in Israel 
(Koren 2003: 215–16).  
  
Given the absence of competition, al-Ittihad was in the paradoxical position of being 
both counter-hegemonic and hegemonic at the same time. As one of the few 
opposition newspapers (and the only Arabic newspaper) allowed to legally operate in 
Israel, it had exclusive and, for several decades, unrivalled dominance in the 
Palestinian Arab media sector. It was the only newspaper in Israel, or the Middle East 
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for that matter, to provide critical coverage of issues relating specifically to local and 
national Palestinian Arab affairs, which it did from its own political perspective. As 
the dominant voice of dissent within the minority, it provided a showcase for several 
renowned Palestinian writers and poets, including Emil Habibi, Emil Touma, Hana 
Ibrahim, Tawfiq Ziad, Samih al-Qasim and Mahmoud Darwish.  
 
The ethnic make-up of its editorial ranks, together with its clear political and counter-
hegemonic attitude towards the authorities, galvanized the negative reputation that it 
had with an Israeli establishment, which saw it as a tool of political radicalization and 
extremism within the minority. Due to its important communicative and 
representative function on behalf of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel – and for a 
certain period on behalf of the Palestinian population of the West Bank also – the 
authorities employed a number of different carrot-and-stick measures to limit or offset 
its counter-hegemonic capacity.  
 
The strategies adopted to counteract the influence of al-Ittihad varied, but initially 
followed a crude and unsophisticated format. Following the establishment of the state, 
the newly created Ministry of the Interior ordered the office of the newspaper to be 
closed for a brief period and in May 1952 the newspaper’s office was once again 
closed by the authorities (Stendel 1996: 213–14). In both cases, closure was justified 
by the authorities on ‘security’ grounds. The closure of 1952, for instance, followed 
an article which al-Ittihad published criticizing the government’s position on the 
Korean War. The article – which was originally run in its Hebrew-language 
counterpart (Kol Ha-Am) – resulted in both newspapers being closed for fifteen days 
on the grounds that they were ‘endangering public safety’ (Stendel 1996: 213–14).  
 
Such measures, however, did not go unchallenged. The decision to close the 
newspapers’ offices in 1952 was lifted following a successful petition by both 
newspapers to the Israeli Supreme Court. The petition represented a landmark case in 
Israel and in Israeli law. The petitioners charged the authorities for breach of freedom 
of speech, and won, thus illustrating not only the tensions between the ethnic and 
democratic interests of the state but the effective use of democratic channels to protect 
the counter-hegemonic discourse of Palestinian Arab media in Israel. This landmark 
decision, however, had another important consequence. Illustrating the reflexive and 
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reciprocal nature of power in society, the control strategies employed by the 
authorities to curb the counter-hegemonic capacity of Palestinian media adapted to 
become more cautious, sophisticated and intelligent.  
 
Aware of the democratic limits of control based on crude strategies such as military 
censorship and closure, the government launched a series of pro-state Arabic 
newspapers that sought not only to challenge the dominance of al-Ittihad but to 
encourage ‘accommodationist’ elements within the minority. Al-Yawm/Today was 
launched in 1948 by the Histadrut, the General Federation of Labour (later integrated 
into the Arabic Press House, within the Office of the Prime Minister), as the official 
Arabic-language organ of the Mapai government in order to fill what it perceived to 
be an ‘information vacuum’ within the Palestinian Arab media sector in Israel (Yu 
and Cohen 2009: 191; Jamal 2009b: 42–43). The newspaper, however, lacked 
credibility and readership within the Palestinian Arab sector and was shut down in 
1967.  
 
Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which served 
to further undermine the credibility of the state amongst Palestinians in Israel, a new 
Arabic publication, al-Anbaa/The News was launched by the authorities as ‘the 
mouthpiece of Israeli official propaganda’ (Yu and Cohen 2009: 191). Unlike al-
Yawm, however, al-Anbaa was primarily focused on Palestinian readers in the OPTs, 
and while it attempted to offer a more conciliatory tone to the minority by allowing 
some space for criticism of state policies within its pages, it ultimately failed to attract 
readers and was closed in 1984 (Jamal 2009b: 46).  
 
Mapam, the main opposition Zionist party in Israel at the time, also ran an Arabic 
weekly newspaper called al-Mirsad/Observation Post. Established in 1951, it 
employed local Palestinian journalists and accommodated criticism of Mapai policies 
within the framework of its own political opposition. As a publication affiliated with a 
Zionist party, however, its ability to reflect the national and political sentiment of the 
minority was constrained and, as a result of a diminishing volume of readers and 
growing financial concerns, the newspaper was finally closed in 1976 (Magal 2010: 
115–16).  
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The crude control strategies of closure and the more sophisticated control measures of 
state propaganda were unable to bring about the type of long-term results desired by 
the state, namely the promotion of an accommodationist and quietist Arab minority in 
Israel that would forego its national identity and rights and accept the political status 
quo of an ethnocratic state dominated by its Jewish ‘core nation’. For some analysts, 
this illustrated the resilient and effective nature of Palestinian Arab counter-
hegemonic strategies and the gradual democratization of state policies towards the 
minority. Such accounts, however, overlook two things. The first is that closures 
continued to take place, albeit sporadically, in later years despite the increased 
democratic openness of society (Ghanem 1998: 437). Such closures, as will be shown 
later on, were justified according to the traditional terminology of ‘security’, thus 
contradicting or at the very least undermining the notion of a linear pattern of policy 
development. The second dimension, which is often overlooked in analyses that 
centralize the democratizing nature of Israeli policy over time is the resilient and 
adaptive nature of an ethnocratic state and its ability to respond to and deal with 
challenges to its hegemony from within. The decreasing significance of crude and 
direct control strategies did not signify an end to state control. While certain measures 
were largely abandoned, other more sophisticated, selective and indirect control 
strategies were gradually introduced over time, which limited the capacity of the 
minority’s counter-hegemonic discourse to upset the political status quo in a more 
efficient and effective way.  
 
One area which illustrates the development of a system of control that is based on 
more sophisticated, selective and indirect measures is the Israeli legal system. While 
strategies of controlling Palestinian Arab media through legal means have become 
more typical of today’s media environment, they are not of recent origin. In the early 
years of the state, attempts at media censorship through legal exclusion emerged 
spontaneously and on a largely ad hoc basis. This is demonstrated by the response of 
the Israeli authorities to the al-Ard/The Land movement. Following violent clashes 
with Israeli police in Nazareth in May 1958, the al-Ard movement was established in 
Israel. Taking a more overtly nationalistic stand than the Communist Party on issues 
relating to the minority, al-Ard publications succeeded in attracting Arab journalists 
and readers alike who were disenchanted with both the state and with the narrow 
political interests expressed in al-Ittihad. From the outset, the authorities viewed the 
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al-Ard movement as a distinct and radical threat. Despite several appeals to the 
Supreme Court, the movement was refused a legal permit to register itself as a party 
and, as a result, they were also denied a legal permit to publish. In an attempt to defy 
the state’s ruling, al-Ard publications were distributed illegally. Demonstrating, 
however, the practical and economic pressures and obstacles which result from the 
lack of legal recognition, such publications could only be issued irregularly. Aware 
that the absence of legal recognition jeopardized their ability to survive politically, the 
movement sought to challenge the state by lobbying its case internationally. This 
media-based counter-move, however, did not succeed. In 1964, the Supreme Court 
declared the movement illegal and three of the movement’s leaders were arrested 
(Zureik 1979: 172–74; Jamal 2009b: 49–50). The Court’s decision to make the al-Ard 
movement illegal was justified in the Israeli press in national hegemonic terms for 
‘ignoring the will of the Jewish majority in Israel as well as the State’s authorities’ 
(Zureik 1979: 174), which illustrates the growing confidence of the establishment to 
protect the ethnic nature of the state, even when such decisions contradict democratic 
norms and expectations.  
 
With the termination of the worst excesses of military rule in 1966 and the re-
establishment of contact between Palestinians in Israel and in the OPTs in 1967, the 
political engagement and national awareness of the minority increased substantially. 
Despite its elitist nature, al-Ittihad continued to play a major role in formulating and 
galvanizing dissent against state policies both in the OPTs and within Israel proper. In 
1976, for instance, Palestinian poet and long-time mayor of Nazareth, Tawfiq Ziad, 
who also served as Minister of Knesset (MK) for the Communist Party (Rakah), used 
the newspaper to effectively organize Palestinian strikes throughout the country 
against the government’s programme of wide-scale land expropriation in the Galilee 
(dubbed the ‘Judaization of the Galilee’ or Yehud ha-Galil in Hebrew). The strikes of 
30 March 1976, which have since become commemorated as the first Land Day 
(Yawm al-Ard), resulted in the death of six non-armed Palestinian Arab citizens by 
security forces (Kaufman 1997: 55–57).  
 
The negative attitude of the authorities towards the Communist Party (Rakah) and al-
Ittihad was exposed in a confidential and internal ministerial memorandum that was 
leaked to the Israeli press in September 1976. The leaked report, known as the Koenig 
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Report, was written just one month prior to the Land Day strikes and laid bare the 
attitude of the authorities towards the party and the minority as a whole, and made a 
range of policy recommendations to contain and control them (MERIP 1976: 12). 
Although the Koenig Report confirmed many of the suspicions of the minority 
regarding the state’s attitudes and intentions towards it, many of the policy 
recommendations that it put forward had, by that time, become increasingly 
impractical to implement. This is not to suggest that they were totally abandoned. In 
1988, for instance, Israeli Prime Minister and acting Minister of the Interior, Yitzhak 
Shamir, ordered the offices of al-Ittihad closed for six days ‘as he was convinced that 
it was a factor inciting public riots along with the anticipated demonstrations’ of the 
minority in the run up to the Land Day commemorations and against the backdrop of 
the first intifada which had commenced the year beforehand (Stendel 1996: 217). But 
from the late 1970s, and particularly from the 1980s, new obstacles to control 
emerged in Israel which followed processes of change in local politics, on the one 
hand, and transformations of Israeli media law, on the other, and which necessitated 
changes in the level and nature of engagement by the authorities.  
 
Once isolated and disconnected, the Palestinian Arab minority became reconnected 
with Palestinians in the OPTs in 1967. With the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty of 1979, 
these new contacts gradually expanded to include Arabs throughout the region. This 
period saw not only new levels of exposure and access to Arab media in the region as 
a whole but also witnessed the growing diversification and privatization of Palestinian 
Arab media as a whole. Several new Arabic newspapers were established in the 1980s 
which broke the monopoly which al-Ittihad had held over Arab readers and 
challenged its dominant political representative function on behalf of the minority. 
This period also witnessed a shift in the typical format and content of newspapers in 
Israel. Once dominated by a Hebrew and Arabic ‘political press’ (Magal 2010: 139), 
unaffiliated private and popular press became the new leaders of the print-press 
industry in Israel. The first in this new generation of private Arabic newspapers was 
the weekly as-Sinaara/The Lighthouse newspaper, which was established in Nazareth 
in 1983 as a marketing tool for a local advertising firm. As-Sinaara was followed four 
years later by Kul al-Arab (1987) and one year later by Panorama (1988). These three 
newspapers followed the commercial model set by Hebrew tabloids such as Yediot 
13 
 
Aharanot and Maariv and have come to dominate the majority share of the Arab 
newspaper market in Israel (Jamal 2009b: 65–67). 
 
The diversification of the Arabic print-press industry in Israel in the 1980s is 
frequently cited as proof of the modernization of Palestinian media in Israel and as a 
testimony of the democratization and liberalization of Israeli state policy towards the 
minority. Given the new plurality and diversity of Arabic media, or media in Arabic, 
it is implied that the ability of the state to control its minority is significantly 
diminished if not removed entirely. The veracity of this statement is, however, 
challenged by a closer examination of the content and format of these new Arabic 
media. 
 
It has already been observed that the emergence of a new dominant generation of 
commercial press came directly at the expense of politically affiliated newspapers. 
This shifting dynamic, however, has had critically important consequences not only 
for the content of newspapers, but for their perceived level of threat by the authorities. 
As Jamal has noted, newspapers such as as-Sinaara ‘have introduced a new school of 
journalism that is not politically or ideologically committed but is motivated by profit’ 
(Jamal 2009b: 66). These profit-driven newspapers that minimize or steer clear of 
overtly political content in order to capture the widest demographic of Arabic readers 
possible are ‘more commercial than informative’ in nature (Jamal 2009b: 68). In order 
to satisfy the need for profit, these newspapers have created new patterns of Arabic 
media production and consumption that represent less, rather than more, of a ‘threat’ 
to the state. 
 
While the marginalization of political content within Arabic print press in Israel is in 
large part due to the commercial interests of the newspapers themselves, it is also 
determined to a significant degree by structural disparities in the media landscape that 
have been emphasized, rather than overcome, by technological changes and that have 
transformed both the media landscape and the demands and expectations of Arab 
audiences as a whole. A brief look at the development of broadcast media in Israel 
illustrates this point.  
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Until the 1980s, Arabic broadcast media remained highly regulated and 
underdeveloped in Israel. The first Arabic radio channel in Israel, Sawt Israel/Voice 
of Israel, which was opened in 1958 and is still in operation today, was established by 
the Prime Minister’s Office and run by Mizrahi Jews (Arabic-speaking Jews) to 
reflect the official line of the state (Jamal 2009b: 50–51). With the deregulation of the 
Israeli economy and the development of new broadcasting technologies in the 1980s, 
and the growth of Hebrew proficiency amongst the minority, Palestinians could tune 
in and listen to a growing number of Hebrew radio channels (notably Reshet Bet and 
Gali Tzahal) as well as any number of Arabic radio channels broadcast from around 
the Middle East (notably Sawt al-Arab from Cairo and Ajyal from Ramallah) and 
from Europe (BBC and Monte Carlo).  
 
These broadcasts, which exposed Palestinians in Israel to alternative perspectives on 
various political issues relating to Israel and the region, undoubtedly contributed to 
the development of a distinct Palestinian counter-hegemonic discourse in Israel. They 
also, however, served to conceal the deeper structural obstacles that were in place and 
which limited the development of Palestinian media inside Israel. The diversity of 
radio broadcasts that are available to the minority in Arabic ignores the fact that the 
only independent and locally based Arabic radio station based in Israel today (Radio 
Ashams) was created only recently, in 2003. An attempt to launch a radio station 
(Radio 2000) in Nazareth in 1997 failed when the Jewish and Arab owners of the 
station fell out and the authorities withdrew the station’s licence subsequent to its 
coverage of the October 2000 demonstrations in which thirteen Palestinian citizens of 
the state were killed by Israeli police and security forces (Jamal 2009b: 71).  
  
The situation of televised and satellite media in Israel tells a similar story. For almost 
three decades following the first televised broadcasts in the 1960s, only one (Hebrew) 
television channel operated in Israel (Jamal 2009b: 71). With the relaxation of 
government regulation of media from the late 1980s, however, Israel emerged from 
economic recession as a global leader in the production of communications-related 
hardware and software and as a regional power in the area of satellite industries. A 
second channel (Channel 2) was created in 1992, followed by another channel 
(Channel 10) ten years later in 2002 (Jamal 2009b: 71). To this can be added dozens 
of external Arabic channels that Palestinians have access to today: LBC, al-Jazeera, 
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Rotam, MBC, Future, al-Arabiyya, al-Manar, etc. (Jamal 2009b: 115). Despite this 
dizzying variety of channels, there is still not a single Arabic television channel in 
operation inside Israel today. 
  
How can this underdevelopment of Palestinian broadcast media inside Israel be 
explained? The answer lies in a combination of pragmatic and ideological factors. On 
the one hand, it is evident that there is an underlying discrimination against 
Palestinian media with regards to development, investment and regulation 
opportunities in Israel, which is obscured by the diversity of external Arabic media 
that are available to the minority. This ‘pluralistic façade’ (Jamal 2009b: 52) conceals 
discrimination against Palestinian Arab media in Israel and promotes a positive and 
liberal image of the state at home and abroad, thus satisfying one of the important 
bases of ethnocratic control – ‘selective openness’.  
  
Practical factors connected with the asymmetrical development of Arabic media 
inside Israel have also played an important factor in the development of 
underdeveloped Palestinian media in Israel. Palestinian print and broadcast media are, 
due to their small demographic, unable to compete with better-equipped and better-
financed globalized and electronic-based Arabic media, which are often both cheaper 
and more easily accessible to Palestinians in Israel than Palestinian media themselves. 
Jamal’s analysis of patterns of media consumption reveals that Palestinian media are 
not the main go-to source for ‘hard’ news in Israel. The vast majority of Palestinians 
in Israel (81.7 per cent) switch on their televisions and tune into al-Jazeera and 
Channel 2 to receive the latest news (Jamal 2009b: 112–15). This pattern of media 
consumption is underscored by the fact that the three most popular Arabic newspapers 
in Israel today are not daily, but rather weekly newspapers. Only 9.3 per cent of the 
Palestinians he surveyed read Palestinian Arabic newspapers on a daily basis (Jamal 
2009b: 74). This has increased the dependence of Palestinian Arabs on external media 
sources which has, in turn, aggravated the marginality and underdevelopment of 
Palestinian media. Given that big networks now command the lion’s share of the 
Arabic media market in Israel, particularly where ‘hard news’ is concerned, local 
Arabic newspapers in Israel have become increasingly depoliticized and, from the 
point of view of the authorities, increasingly negligible.  
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With the introduction of the Internet and other related online media in the early 1990s, 
the image of an open and vibrant media landscape in Israel has become more 
pronounced. Indeed, Israel is ‘among the world’s leading countries in broadband 
Internet penetration’ today (Brown 2008: 304) and with 72 per cent of its population 
connected to the Internet, it is second only to Bahrain in Internet usage within the 
Middle East as a whole (Internet World Stats 2010). This high rate of online 
connectivity has resulted in new patterns of media consumption in Israel 
demonstrated by the fact that, by 2008, the Internet had become a go-to source for 
news second only to television (Brown 2008: 304). In two well-known surveys on 
press freedom, Israel has – despite the impact of military censorship – fared 
exceptionally well compared to its Middle Eastern neighbours, thus underscoring the 
image of Israel as a ‘free’ media environment (Reporters Without Borders 2010; 
Freedom House 2010).  
 
Such positive reviews of press freedom in Israel have also filtered through to 
academic analyses. In a 2008 survey of Internet filtering in sixteen different MENA 
countries, for example, Deibert has described Israel together with only four other 
countries in the region as demonstrating ‘no evidence of consistent technical filtering 
used to deny access to online content’ (Deibert et al. 2008: 207). The absence of 
Internet censorship involving the use of digital filtering and blocking technologies 
such as IP address-based packet filtering, DNS poisoning, cache filtering and 
keyword searches, has satisfied many that Palestinian Arab media in Israel is, indeed, 
open, free and relatively privileged. Such general conclusions are, however, flawed as 
they rely on a limited and selective range of variables against which media freedom in 
Israel is tested.  
 
While it is true that Israel does not employ sophisticated technologies to censor or 
tamper with online content, the question whether such technologies are required and 
whether other forms of offline controls can accomplish the same goals has not been 
adequately addressed in the literature. It can, for instance, be argued that the need for 
Internet controls has been significantly reduced by the continued underdevelopment 
of the Palestinian Internet environment. In order to understand this point an important 
distinction must be made between local media production, on the one hand, and 
access to media on the other. Having access to a wide range of Internet sites in Arabic 
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often conceals the status and relevance of locally-produced Arabic Internet sites in 
Israel. Several Palestinian newspapers and political parties in Israel have launched 
websites in recent years, such as as-Sinaara (owned by as-Sinaara), Farfesh and al-
Arab (related to Kul al-Arab), Arabs48 (affiliated with Balad/NDA), and Panet 
(owned by Panorama), all of which have contributed to the pluralistic image of Israeli 
media and society (Jamal 2009a: 566). However, as Dahan has observed, the only 
locally produced Arabic daily newspaper in Israel – al-Ittihad – still does not have an 
online version, while the online content of other Arabic newspapers in Israel remains 
rather limited in scope and coverage when compared with their printed counterparts. 
The underdeveloped state of ‘indigenous Palestinian Israeli websites’ has resulted in 
an increased reliance upon Hebrew and external Arabic websites, which do not reflect 
the particular local concerns and interests of Palestinian Israelis (Dahan 2003). This 
has limited the counter-hegemonic potential of CMCs for the Palestinian Arab 
minority and reduced the need for online controls.  
  
However, with the growth of increasingly accessible and affordable Internet 
technologies, the shape and format of political dissent has undergone fundamental 
changes which have, in turn, introduced a new range of political actors and mediators. 
Political activity is no longer restricted to traditional political parties and news 
providers. In Israel, new online political mediators have emerged which not only 
disseminate counter-hegemonic discourses but which have also become go-to sources 
for specialist ‘hard news’ and local information. This is particularly evident with 
regard to the new political role played by civil society activists and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Israel. Using the power of the Internet to promote their 
political advocacy at home and abroad, their focused political activity has arguably 
become the media form with the greatest capacity to challenge the political hegemony 
of the Jewish majority in Israel today.  
 
Following the new Law of Associations which was passed in 1980 and which 
required all NGOs to register with the Ministry of the Interior (Payes 2003: 62), the 
number of Palestinian Israeli NGOs (PINGOs) has grown and developed in direct 
relationship with the pluralization and deregulation of Israeli media. Given the 
asymmetrical power dynamics in society, PINGOs have focused much of their 
activities on ‘attempting to elevate the civil status of the Palestinian minority in Israel’ 
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and on ‘redefining the boundaries of political discourse’ in Israel (Payes 2003: 61, 
81). Serving an important representative and communicative function within Israel, 
PINGOs have increasingly become an important ‘channel of political mobility’ and 
counter-hegemony in Israel (Payes 2003: 64). The counter-hegemonic political 
discourse of the minority that emerged and gained momentum through the political 
advocacy of PINGOs is demonstrated by the relevance of four position papers 
collectively referred to as the ‘Future Vision Documents’, which were published in a 
six-month period between December 2006 and May 2007. Developing the political 
vision originally propounded by Azmi Bishara that the State of Israel become a ‘state 
for all its citizens’, these documents called for recognition of the Palestinian Arab 
minority as a distinct national minority and for full equality between Jews and Arabs 
to be accomplished by dismantling the Jewish ethnocratic nature of the state and 
replacing it with either a secular or consociational democracy (Rekhess 2007: 17).  
 
Given that important sections of Israeli Jewish society saw in these documents ‘a 
declaration of war’ (Rekhess 2007: 20), it is hardly surprising that PINGOs have since 
come to be viewed with a heightened sense of mistrust and prejudice. The state has 
employed a range of measures to offset or limit the counter-hegemonic potential of 
PINGOs. Of these, legislation remains a major avenue through which this is 
accomplished. The power to extend, deny or remove legal recognition of associations 
that are deemed to contradict or challenge the Jewish ethnic nature of the state 
increases the power of the state and the dependency of PINGOs upon it (Payes 2003: 
63). The 1964 decision to outlaw the al-Ard movement established a precedent for 
exclusion through legal means. With the introduction of the 1980 Law, however, the 
legal options to exclude Palestinian associations were expanded. It was now, for 
instance, possible to outlaw any Israeli organization with the word ‘Palestinian’ in its 
name as this would ‘be offensive to public feeling’ (Payes 2003: 67–68). 
 
Another increasingly common strategy that has been employed by the state is the 
targeting of individual PINGO leaders and activists. The ‘personification of 
institutions and leadership roles’ which Jamal has observed to be a widespread 
phenomenon in the Middle East (Jamal 2006: 16–17) has facilitated the state’s efforts 
to discredit and silence dissenting voices within the minority through targeted legal 
and extralegal measures on individuals. Physical assaults and intimidation by police 
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and security officers, official investigations (often involving arrest and imprisonment 
without trial), restrictions of movement and travel bans as well as legal prosecution on 
various charges relating to national security – experiences that were once restricted to 
Palestinian political leaders such as Azmi Bishara of the Balad movement and Sheikh 
Ra’id Salah of the Islamic movement (Cook and Key 2002) – have, since the 
watershed events of October 2000 in which thirteen Palestinian citizens of the state 
were killed by security forces, begun to be experienced by wider segments of the 
Palestinian leadership in Israel, including by prominent PINGO leaders and activists.  
 
The cases of Ameer Makhoul, director of Ittijah, a union of Arab NGOs in Israel, and 
political activist, Omar Saeed, who were arrested and sentenced to prison terms in 
2010 for ‘spying’ for Hezbollah illustrate this new turn in policy (Adalah 2010a). The 
experiences of several prominent Palestinian leaders (notably Ms Haneen Zoabi 
(Balad MK), Sheikh Raed Salah (head of the Islamic Movement in Israel) and Dr 
Mohammad Zeidan (chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of 
Israel and director of the PINGO Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA)) at the 
hands of the Israeli press and authorities following their decision to take part in the 
May 2010 attempt to break the siege on Gaza confirms this shift towards 
individualized targeting tactics by the authorities (Adalah 2010b). This, together with 
a wave of new legislation which, if passed, will redefine the boundaries of permissible 
NGO activity in Israel and limit the scope of political advocacy and freedom of 
expression available to Jewish and Palestinian NGOs alike in Israel (Adalah 2010c), 
illustrate not only the growing tension between democratic opportunities and 
ethnocratic controls but, cumulatively, the continued dynamic range of mechanisms 
available to ethnocratic states in responding to counter-hegemonic challenges.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Through an integrated assessment of ethnocratic theory and state policy towards 
Palestinian Arab media in Israel, this article has demonstrated the resilient, dynamic 
and reflexive nature of the Israeli system of control in responding to Palestinian 
counter-hegemonic challenges through the media. Through a wide range of legal and 
extralegal, sophisticated and crude as well as direct and indirect strategies, the State of 
Israel has, thus far, been able to successfully mitigate the democratically available 
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channels of protest that have been employed by the Palestinian Arab minority to 
challenge its unequal status in society and push for political reform of the system. The 
future sustainability of ethnocratic controls, however, is not guaranteed. Engaged in a 
constant struggle between ethnic and democratic tensions, as well as between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces, the future stability of the Israeli system of 
control ultimately depends upon the continued broad level of support and consensus 
that it currently derives from the Jewish majority.  
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